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We identify different kinds of relevance relations between formulas that emerge in the
process of belief revision. Informal definitions for alternative notions of relevance are sug-
gested and a set of schemas and intuitive postulates for formalizing these notions are pro-
posed. The notions of relevance proposed here are shown to be good candidates for modeling
the process of belief revision.
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1 Introduction
Belief revision is the process by which an agent changes his previous set of beliefs making a
transition from one epistemic state to another. When such an agent learns new information he
can realize that this information clashes with his old beliefs. In this case the agent has to revise
his belief set and decide which old beliefs need to be eliminated in favor of the new information.
The aim of this work is to characterize the different kinds of relations that may exist be-
tween new acquired information and old maintained beliefs. We identify four primitive kinds of
relations between a new piece of information α and an old piece of information β:
1. α is positively relevant to β if β is incorporated to the belief set whenever the agent learns
α.
2. α is negatively relevant to β if β is retracted from the belief set whenever the agent learns
α.
3. α is positively irrelevant to β if β is not incorporated to the belief set when the agent learns
α.
4. α is negatively irrelevant to β if β is not retracted from the belief set when the agent learns
α.
A fifth interesting kind of relation between α and β arises when either α is positively relevant
to β or α is negatively irrelevant to β. This relation holds when β is part of the updated belief
set, regardless of whether it belonged to it or not before α was learned.
In [Falappa 99] the notion of negative irrelevance was taken as a primitive notion and a set
of intuitive postulates was given to formalize it. The postulates for negative irrelevance were
shown to be as powerful as the AGM postulates for contraction. In this work we extend the
above mentioned results by presenting a formal characterization for the fifth kind of relation
and by distinguishing three different notions of relevance that naturally emerge and that have
their counterpart in three well known contraction functions, namely maxichoice, full meet and
partial meet.
2 Belief Revision
One of the most fundamental approaches to the formalization of the dynamics of beliefs is
the AGM model [Alchourro´n 85], proposed by Carlos Alchourro´n, Peter Ga¨rdenfors and David
Makinson. In the AGM approach the epistemic states are represented by belief sets. Let K be
a belief set and α a sentence in a propositional language L. The three main kinds of changes
are the following [Ga¨rdenfors 92]:
Expansion: A new sentence is added to an epistemic state regardless of the consequences
of the so formed larger set. If + is an expansion operator, then K+α denotes the belief
set K expanded by α.
Contraction: Some sentence in the epistemic state is retracted without adding any new
belief. If − is a contraction operator, then K−α denotes the belief set K contracted by α.
Revision: A new sentence is consistently added to an epistemic state. In order to make
possible this operation, some sentences may be retracted from the original epistemic state.
If ∗ is a revision operator, then K∗α denotes the belief set K revised by α.
Expansions can simply be defined as the logical closure of K and α:
K+α = Cn(K ∪ {α})
It is not possible to give a similar explicit definition of contractions and revisions in logical and
set-theoretical notions only. These operations can be defined using logical notions and some
selection mechanism. Contractions and Revisions are interdefinable by the following identities:
Levi Identity: K∗α = (K−¬α)+α.
Harper Identity: K−α = K ∩K∗¬α.
By giving a definition of one of these operators we can obtain the other one using the above
identities. In this work we will show the relation existing between the notion of (ir)relevance
and the contraction operator.
The following Lemma is a straight consequence of Levi Identity.
LEMMA 2.1 Given a belief set K and a formula α ∈ L, K−¬α ⊆ K∗α. 
2.1 Postulates for Contractions
Ga¨rdenfors [Ga¨rdenfors 88] proposed the following rationality postulates for contraction opera-
tors:
(K−1) Closure: For every belief set K and every sentence α, K−α is a belief set.
(K−2) Inclusion: K−α ⊆ K.
(K−3) Vacuity: If α 6∈K then K−α = K.
(K−4) Success: If 0 α then α 6∈K−α.
(K−5) Recovery: K ⊆ (K−α)+α.
(K−6) Extensionality: If ⊢ α↔ β then K−α = K−β.
(K−7) Conjunctive Overlap: K−α ∩K−β ⊆ K−(α ∧ β).
(K−8) Conjunctive Inclusion: If α 6∈K−(α ∧ β) then K−(α ∧ β) ⊆ K−α.
2.2 Contraction functions and their associated postulates
A basic assumption behind most theories of belief revision is that an agent should maintain as
many of the earlier beliefs as possible. This means that, in order to eliminate inconsistency, he
must do minimal changes. But there is not a unified criterion for defining a minimal change.
If we want preserve as much information as possible we should look for a maximal subset of
the original state of belief that fails to imply the unwanted formula. The set of all the maximal
subsets of K failing to imply α is denoted K⊥α.
In general, K⊥α contains more than one maximal subset. In order to construct a contraction
function it is possible to apply a selection function γ to select one element from K⊥α. The set
that is returned by γ(K⊥α) can be seen as the “preferred” element from K⊥α. The contraction
of K by α can be defined as follows:
K−α =
{
γ(K⊥α) if K⊥α 6= ∅.
K otherwise
and is referred to as maxichoice contraction function.
Contractions defined in this way satisfy postulates (K−1)..(K−6) together with the following
postulate:
(K−F) Fullness: If β ∈ K and β 6∈K−α then (β → α) ∈ K−α for any belief set K.
Postulate (K−F) suggests that maxichoice contractions retain too much information. This
gives rise to suggest another selection function, one that instead of returning a selected element
of K⊥α, returns the set that results from the intersection of all the elements of K⊥α. This form
of contraction of K by α can be defined in the following way:
K−α =
{
∩(K⊥α) if K⊥α 6= ∅.
K otherwise
and is referred to as full meet contraction function.
Contractions defined using a full meet contraction function satisfy postulates (K−1)..(K−6)
together with the following postulate:
(K−I) Intersection: For all α and β, K−(α ∧ β) = K−α ∩K−β.
The above does not seem to be a desirable postulate since by approving it too much infor-
mation is removed. This is against the desired principle of minimal change.
There is a third possibility that results from making a compromise between the maxichoice
contraction function and the full meet contraction function. This alternative contraction function
is referred to as partial meet contraction function and it returns the set that results from the
intersection of the “preferred” elements of K⊥α. According to this construction, the contraction
of K by α can be defined as follows:
K−α =
{
∩γ(K⊥α) if K⊥α 6= ∅.
K otherwise
Contractions defined in this way satisfy postulates (K−1)..(K−8).
2.3 Postulates for Revision
The following postulates for revision have been proposed by Ga¨rdenfors [Ga¨rdenfors 88]:
(K∗1) Closure: K∗α = Cn(K∗α).
(K∗2) Success: α ∈ K∗α.
(K∗3) Inclusion: K∗α ⊆ K+α.
(K∗4) Vacuity: If K 0 ¬α then K∗α = K+α.
(K∗5) Consistency: If 0 ¬α then K∗α 6= K⊥.
(K∗6) Extensionality: If ⊢ α↔ β then K∗α = K∗β.
(K∗7) Superexpansion: K∗(α ∧ β) ⊆ (K∗α)+β.
(K∗8) Subexpansion: If ¬β 6∈K∗α then (K∗α)+β ⊆ K∗(α ∧ β).
3 Irrelevance in the context of Belief Revision
The aim of this section is to formally depict the notion of negative irrelevance as presented in
[Falappa 99]. In section 3.2 we extend the original results by presenting two additional postulates
for negative irrelevance. As previously stated, we expect a formula α to be negatively irrelevant
to a formula β when learning α is not a reason to remove β from the belief set.
For representing irrelevance we use a metalinguistic relation between formulas of a proposi-
tional language L. In our approach irrelevance is seen as a “non-interference relation” between
two formulas, in the context of a belief set. We will take the notion of negative irrelevance as a
primitive relation.
DEFINTION 3.1 Given a belief set K and a pair of formulas α, β ∈ L we say that α is
negatively irrelevant to β and we denote it αIN
K
β if and only if the following two conditions are
simultaneously satisfied:
1. β ∈ K, and
2. β ∈ K∗α.
The following Lemma is a straight consequence of definition 3.1 and Harper Identity.
LEMMA 3.1 Given a belief set K and a pair of formulas α, β ∈ L, αIN
K
β if and only if
β ∈ K−¬α. 
3.1 Postulates for Irrelevance Relations
In [Falappa 99] the following set of postulates for negative irrelevance relations together with










(β → δ) then αIN
K
δ.
(Irr3) If ⊢ (α↔ β) then αI
N
K
δ if and only if βIN
K
δ for all δ ∈ L.
(Irr4) If ⊢ β then αI
N
K
β for all α ∈ L.
(Irr5) If α 6∈K then ¬αI
N
K
β for all β ∈ K.
(Irr6) If β ∈ K then αI
N
K






δ then (α ∨ β)IN
K
δ.








According to lemma 3.1 a negative irrelevance relation of the form αIN
K
β holds if and only if
β ∈ K−¬α. Based on this correspondence it is possible to establish the following result:
THEOREM 3.1 [Falappa 99]: The postulates for irrelevance relations (Irr1)..(Irr8) are satisfied
if and only if the postulates for contraction (K−1)..(K−8) are satisfied. 
3.2 Two additional postulates for irrelevance
Given the postulates (K−F) and (K−I) it is natural to investigate their corresponding irrelevance
relation postulates. We propose two new postulates for irrelevance, namely (Irr9) and (Irr10).
We will show that they can be used to characterize the fullness condition and the intersection
condition respectively.






(Irr10) (α ∨ β)I
N
K





Postulate (Irr9) establishes that learning α will never interfere with both β and (α → ¬β).
In this way, belief sets are kept as large as possible while preserving consistency. Postulate
(Irr10) subsumes postulate (Irr7) by also demanding that it is necessary that both α and β do
not interfere with δ to guarantee that (α ∨ β) will not interfere with δ.
LEMMA 3.2 The postulates for irrelevance relations (Irr1)..(Irr6) and (Irr9) are satisfied if and
only if the postulates for contraction (K−1)..(K−6) and (K−F) are satisfied.
Proof in the Appendix. 
LEMMA 3.3 The postulates for irrelevance relations (Irr1)..(Irr6) and (Irr10) are satisfied if
and only if the postulates for contraction (K−1)..(K−6) and (K−I) are satisfied.
Proof in the Appendix. 
4 New Relations in the context of Belief Revision
In the previous section the notion of negative irrelevance was defined and characterized. The
aim of this section is to introduce other (ir)relevance relations that intuitively emerge in the
context of belief revision.
Given a belief set K, there are two main relevance relations in which two formulas, α and β,
can be involved:
• α is positively relevant to β if and only if β does not belong to K but β belongs to K
revised by α. This relation between α and β will be denoted αRP
K
β.
• α is negatively relevant to β if and only if β belongs to K but β does not belong to K
revised by α. This relation between α and β will be denoted αRN
K
β.
Analogously, we can identify two kinds of irrelevance relations between formulas. One is the
negative irrelevance relation presented in definition 3.1. The other one is the following:
• α is positively irrelevant to β if and only if β belongs neither to K nor to K revised by α.
This relation between α and β will be denoted αIP
K
β.
Another relevance relation between α and β emerges when we expect β to belong to K





























β = {β : β ∈ K∗α}.










































According to the definitions and schemas presented above, we can give the following defini-
tions for the change operators in terms of (ir)relevance relations:
(Def K+α) K+α = {β : K ∪ {α} ⊢ β}.
(Def K−α) K−α = {β : ¬αIN
K
β}.
(Def K∗α) K∗α = {β : αR*
K
β}.
We can present two alternative definitions for K∗α that are equivalent to the one presented
above. The following Lemma presents this result.
LEMMA 4.1 Definition (Def K∗α) is equivalent to the following ones:





(Def” K∗α) K∗α = {β : exists δ such that αIN
K
δ and {α} ∪ {δ} ⊢ β}.
Proof in the Appendix. 
4.1 Postulates for R*
K
Relations
The following postulates characterize R*
K
relations. It is interesting to note their likeness with
the postulates that characterize IN
K
relations. Note, however, that a correspondence of this form











(β → δ) then αR*
K
δ.
(Rel*3) If ⊢ (α↔ β) then αR
*
K
δ if and only if βR*
K
δ for all δ ∈ L.
(Rel*4) If ⊢ β then αR
*
K
β for all α ∈ L.
(Rel*5) If α 6∈K then ¬αR
*
K
β for all β ∈ K.
(Rel*6) If β ∈ K then αR
*
K






δ then (α ∨ β)R*
K
δ for all δ ∈ K.








Postulate (Rel*1) establishes that if the negation of a formula α preserves α, then α is logi-
cally true. Postulate (Rel*2) stands for the condition of modus ponens in the consequent. The
irrelevance of the syntax condition is valid for the R*
K
relation and this is represented by pos-
tulate (Rel*3). According to postulate (Rel
*
4) theorems are always preserved. Postulate (Rel
*
5)
establishes that if a formula α is not in the belief set, the negation of α preserves any formula
that belongs to the belief set. We will assume that a formula α preserves or introduces to the
revised belief set the formula that results from the disjunction of α and any other formula of the
belief set. This last condition is represented by postulate (Rel*6). According to postulate (Rel
*
7),
if α and β preserves δ, then the formula that results from the disjunction of α and β preserves
δ. Finally, postulate (Rel*8) establishes that if the formula (α∨ β) preserves δ or introduces δ to
the revised belief set then, either α preserves or introduces δ or β preserves or introduces δ.
LEMMA 4.2 The postulates for irrelevance relations (Irr1)..(Irr8) are satisfied if and only if





Proof in the Appendix. 




8) are satisfied if and only if the
postulates for revision (K∗1)..(K∗8) are satisfied.
Proof in the Appendix. 
4.2 Two additional postulates for R*
K
As an extension to the set of postulates for R*
K
presented above, we propose two new postulates
for R*
K
that are the natural counterpart of postulates (Irr9) and (Irr10).






(Rel*10) (α ∨ β)R
*
K




δ for all δ ∈ K.
Postulate (Rel*9) establishes that either β or its negation will be preserved or introduced when
new information is learned. Postulate (Rel*10) establishes that the formula (α ∨ β) preserves δ
exactly in those cases in which α preserves δ and β preserves δ.
LEMMA 4.3 The postulates for irrelevance relations (Irr1)..(Irr6) and (Irr9) are satisfied if and







Proof in the Appendix. 
LEMMA 4.4 The postulates for irrelevance relations (Irr1)..(Irr6) and (Irr10) are satisfied if







Proof in the Appendix. 
5 Conclusion
We have presented different kinds of relevance relations that can be used for modeling the
process of theory change. We have proposed a formal characterization for the R*
K
relation.
The postulates that depict this relation naturally follow from the ones that depict the negative
irrelevance relation. While negative irrelevance can be used to model the contraction operator,
the new relation R*
K
can be used to model the process of belief revision. Extensions for the
initial set of irrelevance relation postulates and for the initial set of R*
K
relation postulates were
proposed. We have shown that this extensions are the natural counterpart of existing extensions
to the AGM basic postulates.
6 Appendix: Proofs
LEMMA 3.2. The postulates for irrelevance relations (Irr1)..(Irr6) and (Irr9) are satisfied if and
only if the postulates for contraction (K−1)..(K−6) and (K−F) are satisfied.
Proof. The correspondence between the postulates (Irr1)..(Irr6) and (K
−1)..(K−6) has been
proved in [Falappa 99]. It rests to show that (Irr9) is satisfied if the mentioned postulates for
contraction are satisfied and that (K−F) is satisfied if the mentioned postulates for irrelevance
are satisfied.





(α→ ¬β). If αIN
K
β we are done. If
αIN
K
β is not the case, by Lemma 3.1, we have β 6∈K−¬α. Then, it follows from β ∈ K,
by (K−F) that (β → ¬α) ∈ K−¬α. This is equivalent to (α → ¬β) ∈ K−¬α, which by
Lemma 3.1 is equivalent to αIN
K
(α→ ¬β). This concludes the proof.
(K−F) Assume β ∈ K and β 6∈ K−α. We want to show that (β → α) ∈ K−α. It follows
from β 6∈ K−α by Lemma 3.1 that it is not the case that ¬αIN
K
β. Then, by (Irr9),
¬αIN
K
(¬α→ ¬β) must be the case. It follows by (Irr2) that ¬αI
N
K
(β → α), which by
Lemma 3.1, is equivalent to (β → α) ∈ K−α. This finishes our proof.

LEMMA 3.3. The postulates for irrelevance relations (Irr1)..(Irr6) and (Irr10) are satisfied if
and only if the postulates for contraction (K−1)..(K−6) and (K−I) are satisfied.
Proof. The correspondence between the postulates (Irr1)..(Irr6) and (K
−1)..(K−6) has been
proved in [Falappa 99]. It rests to show that (Irr10) is satisfied if the mentioned postulates for
contraction are satisfied and that (K−I) is satisfied if the mentioned postulates for irrelevance
are satisfied.
According to Lemma 3.1 postulates:
(Irr10) (α ∨ β)I
N
K





(K−I) Intersection: For all α and β, K−(α ∧ β) = K−α ∩K−β
are equivalent. This finishes the proof.

LEMMA 4.1. Definition (Def K∗α) is equivalent to the following ones:





(Def” K∗α) K∗α = {β : exists δ such that αIN
K
δ and {α} ∪ {δ} ⊢ β}.




). Let us prove the equivalence of (Def’ K∗α) and (Def” K∗α).





β. Let us show that there is some δ such that αIN
K
δ and {α} ∪ {δ} ⊢ β. If
αIN
K
β is the case, it is clear that by taking δ = β we obtain the desired result. If αRP
K
β is the
case, we have by (Def RP
K
) that β ∈ K∗α and by Levi Identity we have β ∈ (K−¬α)+α. Then
α→ β ∈ K−¬α, which by Lemma 3.1 is equivalent to αIN
K
α→ β. Since {α} ∪ {α→ β} ⊢ β, it
is clear that by taking δ = α→ β we obtain the desired result.
Let us prove now that that (Def” K∗α) implies (Def’ K∗α). Suppose that there is some β
for which there exists some δ such that αIN
K





β. It follows from αIN
K
δ that
δ ∈ K−¬α. (1)
It follows from {α} ∪ {δ} ⊢ β and 1 that β ∈ (K−¬α)+α. Then, by Levi Identity we have




β. This concludes the proof.

LEMMA 4.2. The postulates for irrelevance relations (Irr1)..(Irr8) are satisfied if and only if





Proof. Suppose that the set of postulates for irrelevance are satisfied. We have to show that the






α. We have to prove ⊢ α. It follows from ¬αR*
K
α and Lemma 4.1 that
there exists some β such that
¬αINKβ, (2)
and
{¬α} ∪ {β} ⊢ α. (3)
It follows from 3 that {β} ⊢ (¬α→ α) which is equivalent to
⊢ (β → α). (4)
It follows from 4 by (Irr4) that
¬αINK(β → α). (5)
It follows from 2 and 5 that ¬αIN
K







(β → δ). We want to prove αR*
K
δ. It follows from αR*
K
β that
there exists φ such that
αINKφ, (6)
and
{α} ∪ {φ} ⊢ β. (7)
It follows from αR*
K
(β → δ) that there exists ϕ such that
αINKϕ, (8)
and
{α} ∪ {ϕ} ⊢ (β → δ). (9)
By (Irr4) we have αI
N
K




It follows from ⊢ ((φ → ϕ) ↔ (φ → (φ ∧ ϕ)), by (Irr3) that αI
N
K
(φ→ (φ ∧ ϕ)). Finally,
from 6 by (Irr2), we can conclude
αINK(φ ∧ ϕ) (10)
From 7 and 9 we can obtain {α} ∪ {φ ∧ ϕ} ⊢ δ which, together with 10, by Lemma 4.1,
leads to αR*
K
δ. This concludes our proof.
(Rel*3) Suppose that ⊢ (α↔ β). We have to prove αR
*
K
δ if and only if βR*
K
δ for all δ ∈ L. The
desired result follows directly by (Irr3) and Lemma 4.1.
(Rel*4) We have to prove that if ⊢ β then αR
*
K
β for all α ∈ L. It follows from ⊢ β by (Irr4) that
αIN
K
β for all α ∈ L. Since {α} ∪ {β} ⊢ β we can conclude by Lemma 4.1 that αR*
K
β.
(Rel*5) This postulate states that if α 6∈K then ¬αR
*
K
β for all β ∈ K. From α 6∈K by (Irr5) we
can conclude ¬αIN
K
β for all β ∈ K. Then, since {α} ∪ {β} ⊢ β we have, by Lemma 4.1,
¬αR*
K
β for all β ∈ K that is the desired result.
(Rel*6) Suppose β ∈ K. We have to prove αR
*
K




(α ∨ β) for all α ∈ L. Since {α} ∪ {α ∨ β} ⊢ (α ∨ β) we can conclude by
Lemma 4.1 that αR*
K
(α ∨ β) for all α ∈ L.





δ. We have to prove (α ∨ β)R*
K
δ. It follows from
αR*
K
δ and δ ∈ K, by Lemma 4.1, that
αINKδ. (11)
Similarly, it follows from βR*
K
δ and δ ∈ K, by Lemma 4.1, that
βINKδ. (12)
From 11 and 12, by (Irr7) we can conclude (α ∨ β)I
N
K
δ. Then, since {α ∨ β} ∪ {δ} ⊢ δ we
can conclude by Lemma 4.1, (α ∨ β)R*
K
δ which is the desired result.
(Rel*8) We have to show that from (α∨β)R
*
K




δ. It follows from
(α ∨ β)R*
K
δ, by Lemma 4.1 that there is some φ such that
(α ∨ β)INKφ, (13)
and
{α ∨ β} ∪ {φ} ⊢ δ. (14)




It follows from 14 that
{α} ∪ {φ} ⊢ δ and {β} ∪ {φ} ⊢ δ. (16)




δ. This finishes the first part
of our proof.
Now suppose that the set of postulates for R*
K
relations are satisfied. We have to show that




α. We have to prove ⊢ α. It follows from ¬αIN
K
α, by (Def IN
K
) and (Def
K∗α), that α ∈ K and ¬αR*
K






(β → δ). We want to prove αIN
K






) and (Def K∗α), that
β ∈ K and αR*Kβ (17)
It follows from αIN
K
(β → δ), by (Def IN
K
) and (Def K∗α), that
(β → δ) ∈ K and αR*K(β → δ) (18)
It follows from 17 and 18 by (Rel*2)
δ ∈ K and αR*Kδ,
which by (Def IN
K
) and (Def K∗α), are equivalent to αIN
K
δ. This concludes the proof.
(Irr3) Suppose that ⊢ (α ↔ β). We have to prove αI
N
K
δ if and only if βIN
K
δ for all δ ∈ L. The
desired result follows directly by (Def IN
K
), (Def K∗α) and (Rel*3).
(Irr4) We have to prove that if ⊢ β then αI
N
K
β for all α ∈ L. By (Def IN
K
) and (Def K∗α), this
is equivalent to prove that if ⊢ β then αR*
K
β and β ∈ K for all α ∈ L. Condition αR*
K
β
follows from ⊢ β by (Rel*4), while β ∈ K follows trivially from ⊢ β.
(Irr5) This postulate states that if α 6∈K then ¬αINKβ for all β ∈ K. By (Def I
N
K
) and (Def K∗α),
proving this postulate is equivalent to prove that if α 6∈K then ¬αR*
K
β for all β ∈ K. But
this is exactly what (Rel*5) states.
(Irr6) Suppose β ∈ K. We have to prove αI
N
K
(α ∨ β) for all α ∈ L. If β ∈ K then, by (Rel*6),
αR*
K
(α ∨ β) for all α ∈ L and (β ∨ β) ∈ K. It follows by (Def IN
K
) and (Def K∗α) that
this result is equivalent to αIN
K
(α ∨ β) for all α ∈ L, which is the desired result.





δ. We have to prove (α ∨ β)IN
K
δ. According to (Def IN
K
) and




δ we can conclude
(α ∨ β)R*
K
δ. This holds by (Rel*7).
(Irr8) We have to show that from (α∨β)I
N
K















δ. This result is valid by (Rel*8). The proof is complete.





8) are satisfied if and only if the
postulates for revision (K∗1)..(K∗8) are satisfied.
Proof. It follows from Lemma 4.2 that postulates (Rel*1)..(Rel
*
8) are satisfied if and only if
postulates (Irr1)..(Irr8) are satisfied. It follows from Theorem 3.1 that postulates (Irr1)..(Irr8)
are satisfied if and only if postulates (K−1)..(K−8) are satisfied. Finally, in [Alchourro´n 85] it
is shown that postulates (K−1)..(K−8) are satisfied if and only if postulates (K∗1)..(K∗8) are
satisfied.

LEMMA 4.3. The postulates for irrelevance relations (Irr1)..(Irr6) and (Irr9) are satisfied if and











6) has been proved in Lemma




that (Rel*9) is satisfied if the mentioned postulates for irrelevance are satisfied.


















β holds, and we are done. If αR*
K




) and (Def” K∗α) that there exists δ such that
αINKδ, (19)




(δ → (α→ ¬β)) and then from 19 by (Irr2) we conclude αI
N
K
(α→ ¬β) that is the
desired result.
To show that (Rel*9) follows from the postulates of irrelevance, assume β ∈ K. Let us










(α→ ¬β) holds. Suppose αIN
K
β is the case. Then, it follows by (Def R*
K
) and (Def’ K∗α)
that αR*
K
β holds. If αIN
K
(α→ ¬β) is the case, by (Def R*
K
) and (Def’ K∗α), we have
αR*K(α→ ¬β). (20)
It follows by (Def R*
K
) and Levi Identity that αR*
K
α. Then from 20, by (Rel*2) we can conclude
αR*
K
¬β, that is the desired result.

LEMMA 4.4. The postulates for irrelevance relations (Irr1)..(Irr6) and (Irr10) are satisfied if











6) has been proved in Lemma




that (Rel*10) is satisfied if the mentioned postulates for irrelevance are satisfied.
In order to show that (Irr10) holds we have to show:
Part 1: From (α ∨ β)IN
K









δ we can conclude (α ∨ β)IN
K
δ.
Part 2 has already been shown to be valid in Lemma 4.2 ((Irr7)). To prove part 1, suppose
(α∨β)IN
K




) and (Def’ K∗α) that δ ∈ K and (α∨β)R*
K
δ





δ hold. Hence, since δ ∈ K, we can







To show that (Rel*10) follows from the postulates of irrelevance we have to show:
Part 1: From (α ∨ β)R*
K









δ we can conclude (α ∨ β)R*
K
δ.
Part 2 has already been shown to be valid in Lemma 4.2 ((Rel*7)). To prove part 1, suppose
δ ∈ K and (α∨β)R*
K




δ holds. Then, it follows
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